In 2014 Tennessee enacted an “exception” to the draconian statutory scheme in Tennessee that makes it a crime to “carry with the intent to go armed … a firearm” anywhere, at any time, even in your own home or on your own property. See, TCA 39-17-1307(a) & (e). Of course, there are statutory “defenses” to that crime such as you are in your home, you are on your own property, you are a judge, or perhaps even that you have a permit. See, TCA 39-17-1308.
But, when Tennessee’s statutory scheme talks about circumstances that are “exceptions” or “defenses” – that means that at trial – perhaps with a jury – the citizen bears the burden of introducing facts and evidence that their conduct was covered by the defense or exception. See, e.g., 39-11-201 to -203. Under Tennessee’s statutory scheme, the investigating officer, the district attorney, the grand jury, the judicial magistrate and/or even the judge at the “preliminary hearing” are not affirmatively required to consider these exceptions or defenses, those are only required to be considered by the “finder of fact”, frequently the jury, at the trial. Of course, that is after the individual has been stopped, detained, questioned, had the firearm seized as evidence, charged, perhaps arrested, booked, and either hired an attorney or had one appointed.
One of these “exceptions” is the vehicle transport law. It was enacted in 2014 so it is still relatively new. A question we commonly receive is how does this law work and what firearms does it include? It is not what you might expect.
The “vehicle transport” law is contained in TCA 39-17-1307(e). The relevant part states:
“(e)(1) It is an exception to the application of subsection (a) that a person is carrying or possessing a firearm, loaded firearm, or firearm ammunition in a motor vehicle or boat if the person:
(A) Is not prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or purchasing a firearm by § 39-17-1316; and
(B) Is in lawful possession of the motor vehicle or boat.”
Note in (e)(1), it uses the term “firearms”. So, then you have to determine is the term “firearm” a statutorily defined term or is it one where you rely on the common dictionary definitions.
It is important to understand that Tennessee statutes are enumerated with a designation that contains three sets of numbers such as XX-XX-XXXX. These three sets of numbers are referred to as “titles”, “chapters” and “parts” in that order. This, the code would be Title# – Chapter# – Part#. Thus, when you see TCA 39-17-13xx that is a shorthand for Title 39, Chapter 17, Part 13. Then, individual statutes such as TCA 39-17-1301 are referred to as “sections.”
The definitions contained in TCA 39-17-1301 pertain to terms used “in this part” meaning that the definitions in that statute pertain to statutes in the range TCA 39-17-13xx. (Presently Sections 39-17-1301 to 39-17-1367)
TCA 39-17-1301 does not define the term “firearm.” But that is not the end of the inquiry since there is also a statute that contains definitions for all of “title” 39, which includes obviously TCA 39-17-1307(e). That statute – TCA 39-11-106 – does contain a definition for a firearm. That definition states:
“(13) “Firearm”:
(A) Means:
(i) Any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;
(ii) The frame or receiver of any such weapon;
(iii) Any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or
(iv) Any destructive device; and
(B) Does not include an antique firearm;”
So, in this “title”, which includes TCA 39-17-1307(e) the vehicle transport statutes, the Legislature defined firearms to include things that most people understand to be firearms but also suppressors as well as “destructive devices.”
So, now we also have to see if the term “destructive device” is defined and not surprisingly it is – it is also defined in the same definition statute – TCA 39-11-106 for use throughout Title 39.
“(10) “Destructive device”:
(A) Means:
(i) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas:
(a) Bomb;
(b) Grenade;
(c) Rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces (4 oz.);
(d) Missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce (0.25 oz.);
(e) Mine; or
(f) Device similar to any of the devices described in subdivisions (a)(10)(A)(i)(a)-(e); and
(ii) Any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device described in subdivision (a)(10)(A)(i) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled; and
(B) Does not include:”
At least on its face, therefore, the defense that the Legislature placed in the vehicle transport statute now would include individuals transporting mines, missiles, rockets, bombs, grenades, poison gas, etc., – but, of course, the individual still bears the burden of proving that this is what they are transporting.
One might view this as fully compliant with the meaning of the term “arms” in the Second Amendment and, if so, it raises numerous other questions regarding the application of the Second Amendment to many of Tennessee’s statutes.
On the other hand, mere possession of one or more these “destructive devices” might be chargeable as a criminal act under other statutes such as TCA 39-17-1302 (which also has several defenses) or federal statutes but at least citizens can hope that they would not also be charged with the misdemeanor offense of “carrying with the intent to go armed … a firearm [i.e., a destructive device]” under Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” statute under TCA 39-17-1307(a) because the “brilliant” legislature expansively defined the term “firearms” to include many things that simply are not “firearms” – at least not in the minds of rational citizens.
This is an example of how Tennessee’s firearms (and weapons) statutes are so poorly constructed that the average citizen might find it difficult if not impossible to read these statutes and be able to accurately predict whether their conduct or intended conduct is or is not a criminal offense, what defenses might apply, whether they can be criminally charged and if so who has to prove what to a jury on the issues of guilt or innocence. There is simply no excuse for this mess.
There is however a cause for this mess – the last 16 years of a Republican super majority in the Tennessee Legislature that has repeatedly and consistently refused to overhaul this part of Tennessee’s law to ensure that Tennessee law is fully consistent with the Second Amendment’s shall not be infringed mandate. That Republican super majority has further failed to make sure that the criminal offenses that are constitutionally permissible are written in such a fashion that the average citizen, the average law enforcement officer, the average district attorney, the average judge, the average grand jury and the average jury all fully understand what the law prohibits such that the only question to be decided is the factual inquiry into whether that law was violated by the accused.