The appeal in Stephen Hughes, et al. v. Bill Lee, et al. was argued before the Tennessee Court of Appeals on June 23, 2026. That appeal concerns the State of Tennessee’s challenge to the decision of the three-judge trial court declaring Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” statute and its parks weapons ban unconstitutional.
Just two days after the Hughes oral argument, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Wolford v. Lopez. In Wolford, the Supreme Court struck down a Hawaii criminal statute that prohibited licensed individuals from carrying firearms on private property open to the public unless the property owner had given express authorization. The Supreme Court held that Hawaii’s law violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments because it severely burdened the right of law-abiding citizens to carry firearms for self-defense in the course of ordinary daily life.
On July 1, 2026, the Plaintiffs in Hughes filed a notice of supplemental authority with the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The notice explains that Wolford is likely relevant to several issues now before the Court of Appeals, including the State’s facial-challenge arguments, the burden-shifting framework under Bruen, Tennessee’s reliance on state-specific history and tradition, the use of Reconstruction-era or outlier historical analogues, and the State’s argument that Tennessee’s broad statutory definition of “firearm” defeats a facial challenge.
The supplemental filing is significant because the State has argued in Hughes that the Plaintiffs must satisfy the “no set of circumstances” standard associated with United States v. Salerno. The Plaintiffs’ notice points out that Wolford was itself a facial Second Amendment challenge, yet the Supreme Court analyzed the case under Bruen and held the Hawaii statute facially unconstitutional without applying Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” formulation. That matters because the Hughes appeal also presents a facial challenge to criminal statutes that burden ordinary firearms possession and carry – just like the flawed Hawaii statutes did.
The filing also addresses the State’s argument in Hughes that a facial challenge fails if a statute might have some constitutional applications. In Wolford, the Supreme Court did not ask whether Hawaii’s statute might be constitutional in some hypothetical application. Instead, the Court examined the real-world burden imposed on law-abiding citizens who seek to carry firearms for self-defense during ordinary daily activities. The Plaintiffs contend that this approach is relevant to Tennessee’s statutes because Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” law and parks weapons ban likewise burden the ordinary exercise of the right to keep and bear arms.
Another important point concerns the role of state-specific history and local preferences. In Hughes, the State has relied on Tennessee’s own history and tradition to defend the challenged laws. In Wolford, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Second Amendment has the same meaning throughout the United States and cannot be diminished by local customs, local preferences, or a state’s particular political culture. That portion of Wolford may be important because Tennessee cannot avoid the federal constitutional floor by pointing to state-specific practices that conflict with the Second Amendment.
The notice also highlights Wolford’s treatment of historical analogues. The Supreme Court rejected Hawaii’s reliance on late, isolated, or outlier laws, including laws from the Reconstruction era that were neither widespread nor widely accepted. That analysis is relevant to Hughes because the State has relied on certain post-ratification laws and other historical materials to defend Tennessee’s restrictions. Under Bruen and now Wolford, the government must identify a relevant historical tradition, not merely isolated or late-enacted restrictions.
Finally, the Plaintiffs’ filing addresses the State’s argument that Tennessee’s broad statutory definition of “firearm” includes destructive devices such as bombs and grenades. The State has argued that this means the challenged statutes could be constitutionally applied to those items and therefore cannot be facially invalid. The Plaintiffs’ notice explains that Hawaii’s statutory definition of “firearm” was also broad and included items such as mortars, bombs, and cannon, yet the Supreme Court in Wolford did not treat those theoretical applications as defeating the facial challenge. That point may be particularly important in responding to Tennessee’s attempt to preserve broad criminal prohibitions by relying on extreme hypotheticals rather than the statutes’ burden on ordinary protected conduct.
The Hughes appeal remains pending before the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The Plaintiffs’ supplemental authority filing does not decide the case, but it places before the Court of Appeals a new and directly relevant decision from the United States Supreme Court. For Tennesseans who care about the right to keep and bear arms, Wolford may substantially affect how the Court of Appeals evaluates Tennessee’s continued defense of statutes that the three-judge panel has already declared unconstitutional.
TFA will continue monitoring the Hughes appeal and will provide updates as the Court of Appeals considers the case.
