The Constitution Comes First

TFA’s Priority is the Constitution

Tennessee Firearms Association is a nonprofit corporation formed by constitutionally focused Tennesseans to promote the right to keep and bear arms, restore government to citizen control, and give full effect to the Bill of Rights and the Tennessee Constitution, with particular emphasis on the Second Amendment and Article I, Section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution. (Tennessee Firearms Association) TFA is not a political party. It is not an arm of the Republican Party or any other political party. It is not a Republican turnout organization, an auxiliary of the Republican Party, or an organization whose principles become secondary once a Republican primary ends.

Political parties have a different purpose or, for some, purposes. Parties nominate candidates, contest elections, organize legislative caucuses, obtain governing majorities, and attempt to obtain and retain political power. Those objectives can sometimes align with the foundations of the Constitution and even with TFA’s constitutional mission, but the two are not interchangeable. TFA can report favorably when a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or other political demographic acts consistently with its constitutional standards and critically when they do not, without becoming either a party organization or an anti-party organization.

The Founders Warned Against Letting Party Replace Principle

The concern that political parties can become substitutes for constitutional judgment and priority is not new. George Washington devoted a substantial portion of his Farewell Address to warning Americans about the “baneful effects of the Spirit of Party.” He warned that party spirit could distract public councils, weaken government, inflame hostility among citizens, and create opportunities for political leaders to elevate themselves at the expense of public liberty. Washington acknowledged that parties might sometimes serve useful purposes, but he nevertheless regarded excessive party attachment as a serious danger in a republic. (Founders Online)

James Madison approached the problem through the concept of faction in Federalist No. 10. He defined faction to include groups united by interests or passions adverse to the rights of other citizens and focused on the danger that a politically powerful faction could use government to sacrifice individual rights. Madison’s concern was therefore not simply that people would disagree politically; it was that organized political power could become hostile to the rights government exists to protect. (Founders Online)

Those warnings have direct relevance to a constitutional-rights organization.

If an organization measures candidates and officials by constitutional performance before a primary but then abandons that standard after a party chooses its nominee, the party has effectively displaced the Constitution as the controlling standard. TFA’s stated mission provides no reason to make that substitution. Thus, whether, for example, TFALAC (a political action committee) supports or opposes a party’s nominee is based on individual considerations and is devoid of party branding.

Tennessee Has More Than Fifteen Years of One-Party Government to Examine

Republicans obtained control of both houses of the Tennessee General Assembly and the governorship in 2011. The 107th General Assembly contained 20 Republican senators to 13 Democrats and 64 Republican representatives to 34 Democrats and one independent, while Bill Haslam took office as governor in January 2011. (Tennessee General Assembly)

That control has continued. The 114th General Assembly contained 27 Republicans and six Democrats in the Senate and 75 Republicans and 24 Democrats in the House. The General Assembly has now adjourned sine die, with the 115th General Assembly scheduled to convene in January 2027. (Tennessee General Assembly)

That history does not mean that every Republican legislator bears equal responsibility for every statute that remains on the books, for every bill that passed or for every bill that failed. Some Republican legislators have introduced, sponsored, voted for, and actively supported measures intended to remove the state’s shackles on firearm rights. Institutional responsibility and individual responsibility must be examined separately.

But fifteen years of unified control does eliminate one explanation for the continued existence of challenged statutes. Tennessee Republicans cannot reasonably attribute their inability to repeal Tennessee statutes to a Democratic legislative majority because there has been no such majority during that period. The failures of the last fifteen years are clear. The relevant questions instead concern what happened within a government controlled by the Republican Party and what individual legislators, committee chairs, caucus leaders, and chamber leaders did with the authority they possessed.

The “Intent to Go Armed” Law Remains an Example of Results Falling Short of Rhetoric

Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(a) (and its predecessors under the prior codification systems) has long made carrying a firearm or club with the intent to go armed a criminal offense, subject to statutory exceptions and defenses. Tennessee’s Legislature has nibbled away at portions of its firearm laws during Republican control, such as removing knives from the same statute, but the General Assembly has not repealed the underlying criminal offense nor other provisions that violate the “shall not be infringed” constitutional mandate.

Yet, there have been specific opportunities to do so. House Bill (HB) 1737, filed in 2026, expressly proposed deleting the offense of unlawful carrying of a firearm or club with the intent to go armed. The official legislative history records that the legislation failed after the Senate Judiciary rolled the bill to 2027. It never attained a floor vote. (Tennessee General Assembly) The same occurred with HB 2064, also filed in 2026, which likewise would have deleted the intent to go armed offense, (Tennessee General Assembly), and yet again with HB 2514, filed in 2026, which was at least a third bill filed by Republican legislators to repeal the “intent to go armed” criminal offense. (Tennessee General Assembly)

That history demonstrates why merely filing a bill cannot by itself does not establish constitutional stewardship. A legislator’s name can appear on legislation that never reaches a vote, and the existence of the bill tells only part of the story. Determining the sponsor’s actual commitment requires examining what happened after filing and, where relevant, why the proposal failed to even achieve a recorded floor vote.

Hughes v. Lee Made the Issue More Concrete

On August 22, 2025, the three-judge trial court panel in Hughes v. Lee entered a final order addressing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(a), the “Going Armed Statute,” and § 39-17-1311(a), the “Parks Statute.” The three-judge trial court panel declared the challenged provisions unconstitutional – something that TFA and a number of individual legislators had been asserting for many years. (Tennessee Courts)

Governor Bill Lee and Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti, official capacity defendants of State, appealed. The Tennessee Court of Appeals granted a stay on September 30, 2025, and a separate three-judge appellate panel heard oral argument on June 23, 2026. As of September 13, 2026, the appellate docket lists no decision, so the distinction between the three-judge trial court panel and the three-judge appellate panel is important, as is the fact that the trial court judgment remains stayed during the appeal. (TN Courts)

The State’s pending appeal did not prevent the General Assembly from repealing those statutes legislatively. In 2026, SB 2467/HB 2064 expressly proposed repealing both the general “intent to go armed” offense and the offense involving weapons in public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, and other public recreational property which were the two statutory provisions directly implicated by the three-judge trial court panel’s decision. (Tennessee General Assembly)

The legislation did not become law. The official record shows that SB 2467 was deferred in the Senate Judiciary Committee to 2027. The House companion, HB 2064, moved into the House Judiciary Committee but was repeatedly deferred and ultimately recorded as “No Action Taken.” Neither measure reached final passage.

Other 2026 proposals also addressed the statutory scheme. HB 1737/SB 1851 proposed removing several firearm offenses, including public-park restrictions, but the House bill was repeatedly deferred and ended on the Criminal Justice Subcommittee’s final calendar, while the Senate companion was deferred to 2027. (Tennessee General Assembly)

HB 2514/SB 2478 went further in some respects, proposing deletion of the general “intent to go armed” offense along with other changes to Tennessee firearm restrictions. The House bill was repeatedly deferred in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee and reset on its final calendar, while the Senate version was deferred to 2027. (Tennessee General Assembly)

Those histories do not establish that every sponsor wanted the legislation to fail or that every Republican opposed repeal. They establish something narrower but significant: multiple proposals existed in 2026 after the unanimous ruling in Hughes v. Lee, Republican legislators possessed overwhelming control of both chambers, the office of Governor was held by Republican Bill Lee, and the 114th General Assembly adjourned without enacting those repeals much less bringing them to a floor vote so that the records of every sitting legislator could be documented.

Other “Gun-Free Zone” Restrictions Present the Same Accountability Question

Tennessee’s location-based firearm restrictions involve multiple statutes and even regulations, so it would be inaccurate to speak of a single “gun-free zone law.” The legislative record nevertheless shows repeated proposals to eliminate particular criminal restrictions associated with firearm-prohibited properties.

In 2024, HB 2032/SB 2912 proposed removing the criminal offense for possessing a weapon on properly posted property and making related changes. The House Civil Justice Subcommittee recommended HB 2032 for passage if amended, but it was later taken off notice in the Civil Justice Committee. The legislation did not become law. (Tennessee General Assembly)

A similar proposal returned in 2026 as HB 985/SB 824. HB 985 was recommended for passage if amended by the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee on a 5-2 vote in March 2026, but the bill later received “No Action Taken” in the House Judiciary Committee. The Senate companion was deferred by the Senate Judiciary Committee to 2027. (Tennessee General Assembly)

Again, the proper conclusion is not that every Republican personally voted against the proposal. Many never had an opportunity to cast a floor vote. Further, the official Legislative histories do not reflect individual actions of legislators who may have supported or opposed the legislation off the record. Ultimately, the relevant institutional fact is that a Republican-controlled legislature had the power to enact the proposal and yet it did not do so. And, very little information has escaped the Legislature “black hole” of information that would shed light on why these bills fail over and over again.

Sponsoring a Bill Is Relevant, but It Is Not the Same as Constitutional Stewardship

TFA can recognize legislators who introduce, sponsor, carry, and vote for legislation that advances constitutional rights. But putting a name on a bill cannot be the end of the analysis because Tennessee’s legislative process contains numerous points at which legislation can advance, be delayed, be removed from a calendar, or die without a final floor vote. Further, with decades of experience, it is clear that sometimes a sponsor is not truly an advocate for the bill.

The House rules provide that the Speaker appoints House committees, standing-committee chairs and vice chairs, and subcommittee chairs. The House Committee on Calendar and Rules also plays a significant gatekeeping role: the General Assembly’s own explanation of the legislative process states that, unlike the Senate Calendar Committee, the House Calendar and Rules Committee can determine whether a bill reaches the House floor.

The Senate rules likewise provide that the Speaker appoints standing, special, and select committees and appoints the chair and vice chairs of standing committees. Those are meaningful institutional powers because committee composition and committee leadership affect where legislation is considered and who controls proceedings at important stages. (Tennessee General Assembly)

That procedural structure does not prove that a particular sponsor ever filed a bill merely to control or defeat it. Such an accusation would require evidence about the legislator’s conduct and intent. But the structure does demonstrate why sponsorship standing alone is insufficient evidence of effective constitutional leadership. Indeed, sometimes the best way to control whether an issue moves forward – or does not – is to be the sponsor and then simply fail to push it through the system while at the same time claiming to voters that the sponsor was a “leader” on the issue.

A serious stewardship analysis asks what happened after the bill was filed. Did the sponsor seek hearings and timely consideration? Did the sponsor resist repeated deferrals? Did the sponsor seek recorded votes where the rules permitted them? When the bill failed, did the sponsor explain why? If another legislator, committee chair, caucus leader, or chamber leader impeded the measure, did the sponsor identify that person and challenge the decision, particularly if the obstruction came from within the sponsor’s own party?

Those questions separate symbolic sponsorship from sustained legislative effort. A legislator may genuinely fight for a bill and lose, but the evidence of that fight should ordinarily extend beyond the sponsor line on the bill’s first page and to be credible must be supported by objective facts of advocacy.

The Hardest Test Comes When Principle Conflicts With Party Loyalty

It is relatively easy for a Republican officeholder to criticize Democrats for opposing a Second Amendment proposal, just as it is relatively easy for a Democrat to criticize Republicans on an issue important to Democratic constituencies. The more informative test of constitutional stewardship arises when an official must choose between constitutional principles and the preferences of political allies.

Suppose a legislator repeatedly tells constituents that repeal of an identified firearm restriction is constitutionally necessary. If the bill then dies while that legislator’s own party overwhelmingly controls the chamber, a stewardship analysis can reasonably examine what the legislator did in response. Silence, public confrontation, continued legislative effort, acceptance of leadership’s decision, or an effort to obtain recorded accountability are different forms of conduct, and the public record can distinguish among them.

The Tennessee Constitution reinforces why that distinction matters. Members of the General Assembly swear to support both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions and further swear not to assent to acts that would tend to lessen or abridge rights and privileges declared by the Tennessee Constitution. The constitutional oath identifies the Constitution and the people’s rights—not obedience to a caucus or party organization—as the formal obligation of office. (Tennessee General Assembly)

Leadership Carries More Responsibility Because Leadership Has More Power

Leadership positions deserve particular scrutiny under a constitutional-stewardship standard because legislative leaders possess powers that rank-and-file members do not. In the House, the Speaker appoints committees and their chairs, vice chairs, and subcommittee chairs. In the Senate, the Speaker appoints committees and their principal officers.

That does not mean a Speaker can unilaterally enact legislation. Bills still require the votes required by the Constitution and legislative rules. It does mean that leadership has institutional influence over the structure through which legislation must travel, and that influence is relevant when evaluating a long-term record.

Accordingly, constitutional stewardship cannot reasonably be measured solely by asking whether a leader verbally supported a measure or appeared as a sponsor. A more complete inquiry examines what happened to the proposal within the legislative structure that leader helped control, what steps the leader took to advance it, and whether the leader used available authority to remove obstacles or instead tolerated repeated failure.

Electoral Replacement Is One Form of Constitutional Accountability

Elections permit citizens to evaluate incumbents not only on promises but on what happened while those incumbents possessed governmental authority. From a constitutional-stewardship perspective, replacing an incumbent who has repeatedly had a meaningful opportunity to advance constitutional reforms but has failed to produce those results is therefore a recognizable form of political accountability.

That proposition does not depend on assuming that every challenger is better. A challenger may prove less effective, less committed, or less capable than the incumbent. The relevant principle is narrower: incumbency and party nomination do not create an entitlement to continued support or establish constitutional stewardship by themselves.

Leadership turnover can have effects beyond changing a single legislative vote. Tennessee legislators elect the presiding officers of their chambers, and those Speakers then exercise substantial appointment authority over committees and committee officers. Changing the membership from which leadership is selected can therefore result in new leadership structures and new legislative gatekeepers. (Tennessee General Assembly)

That is the institutional basis for the “pruning” analogy. Pruning a branch does not guarantee that the next branch will be stronger, but electoral turnover can require a political institution to develop new leadership and can alter the incentives facing those who remain. The concept is one of accountability rather than a guarantee of a particular legislative result.

An Independent or Third-Party Candidate Is Not Constitutionally Inferior Because of the Ballot Label

The same analysis means that an Independent, Libertarian, or other non-major-party candidate cannot logically be presumed to be a worse constitutional steward merely because that candidate lacks the Republican or Democratic label. Party identification describes a political affiliation; it does not establish how an officeholder will respond when constitutional principles collide with party interests.

In a particular race, an independent candidate may demonstrate greater willingness to act without caucus pressure than a major-party incumbent. In another race, the opposite may be true. An independent may also enter a legislature with fewer institutional relationships and less influence over committees, so independence alone should not receive automatic credit either.

The appropriate constitutional-stewardship inquiry therefore remains candidate-specific. What has the incumbent actually done? What evidence supports the challenger’s commitments? Has either candidate demonstrated a willingness to place constitutional principles above political advancement, caucus preferences, donors, endorsements, or party unity? Those questions are more informative than simply asking which party appears beside the candidate’s name.

“Support the Nominee or You Help the Democrat” Is an Electoral Argument, Not a Constitutional Standard

Party advocates frequently argue after a primary that failing to support their nominee effectively helps the opposing major party. There is an understandable electoral calculation behind that argument because votes cast for other candidates can affect the relative totals of the major-party nominees. But that does not answer the constitutional-stewardship question.

If TFA adopted the proposition that a Republican nominee must receive deference simply because criticism, abstention, or consideration of another candidate might benefit a Democrat, TFA’s ability to hold Republican officials accountable would largely disappear once a primary ended. During the primary, members could supposedly examine records and compare performance. After the primary, however, the party label would become controlling and the nominee’s past record would become entirely secondary, at best, to the objective of defeating the opposing party.

That structure can create a significant accountability problem. An officeholder could campaign as a constitutional conservative, remain in power for many years while identified infringements remained in Tennessee law, fail to produce repeal, decline to identify members of the officeholder’s own party who obstructed reform, and then argue at the next general election that criticism or consideration of another candidate must end because party unity is necessary.

That may be a valid argument for a political party whose primary if not sole objective is electing its nominees. It is not a valid governing rule for an organization whose stated mission priority is enforcement of constitutional protections.

Sometimes Changing the Law Requires Changing the People Who Control the Process

Constitutional stewardship can therefore involve more than identifying bad statutes and proposing their repeal. When elected officials have repeatedly possessed the opportunity and institutional authority to address an identified constitutional problem, their performance becomes part of the evidence by which stewardship can be evaluated and fault attributed.

That is particularly true for leadership. If the same leadership structure repeatedly presides over the failure of measures that members of the majority party themselves describe as constitutional priorities, it is legitimate to examine whether retaining the same leaders is likely to reproduce the same legislative process. Electoral turnover is one lawful mechanism through which citizens can require a new set of officeholders and, potentially, new legislative leadership just as happened in Tennessee when power was shifting in the Legislature from Democrat to Republican control.

This does not establish that an Independent, Libertarian, Republican, Democrat, or any other challenger should win a particular election. It establishes the more basic principle that a constitutional-rights organization need not treat preservation of a party’s existing leadership structure as an objective superior to constitutional accountability.

Performance Is More Probative Than Branding

Endorsements, candidate questionnaires, campaign advertisements, and organizational ratings can all provide information. But each has limits. An endorsement represents another organization’s judgment under its own criteria or bias, while a campaign promise describes what a candidate says will happen in the future.

An incumbent’s legislative record provides different evidence. It shows what happened when the officeholder actually had power: what legislation was introduced, what hearings occurred, how the official voted, whether legislation advanced, what happened when it failed, whether political allies were challenged, and whether the promised reform ultimately became law. In Tennessee, its obvious that the last fifteen years exhibit the existence of constitutional problems and campaign promises to correct them and, yet, the constitutional problems persist unabated.

TFA can therefore reasonably distinguish between someone who merely sponsored a bill and someone who demonstrated sustained effort to enact it. It can distinguish between a legislator who quietly accepts the defeat of a claimed constitutional priority and one who identifies the obstruction and attempts to overcome it. It can also distinguish between leadership that has produced identifiable results and leadership that repeatedly asks voters to accept promises despite years of opportunity.

The Constitution Cannot Be First Only When Party Interests Permit It

Washington warned about allowing party spirit to dominate public judgment, Madison warned about factions acting adversely to individual rights, and Tennessee legislators themselves swear an oath to support the federal and state Constitutions and to protect constitutional rights. Those principles are difficult to reconcile with a rule under which party loyalty automatically overrides examination of an incumbent’s performance. (Founders Online)

TFA can report favorably on Republicans whose records warrant favorable reporting and critically on Republicans whose records warrant criticism. It can apply exactly the same standard to Democrats, Independents, Libertarians, and other candidates. An independent may sometimes prove a stronger constitutional steward than a major-party incumbent, while in another contest the incumbent may have the stronger record; the party label alone cannot answer that question.

After more than fifteen years of Republican control of Tennessee state government, TFA has a substantial record against which promises can be compared with results. Tennessee Republicans have enacted some measures marginally pertaining to firearm rights, and individual Republican legislators have made substantial efforts toward other reforms that failed under the tenure of the super majority’s authority. At the same time, the general “intent to go armed” offense remains in the statutory structure, the statutes addressed by the three-judge trial court panel in Hughes were not legislatively repealed during the 2026 session, and specific proposals to eliminate other firearm-location restrictions likewise failed to become law. (Tennessee General Assembly)

For TFA, constitutional independence means being willing to examine all of that evidence without first asking whether doing so helps or hurts a political party. The proper measure of constitutional stewardship is not the jersey, the endorsement, the campaign slogan, or the sponsor line on a bill. It is what public officials do with power when protecting constitutional rights requires them to confront obstacles including obstacles created by their own political party.

For voters, the issue is one of their individual priorities. If the voter places a priority on constitutional rights and stewardship, then the question may become whether that priority must yield to demands by the party – particularly the one that has had power – for party loyalty regardless of constitutional failure.