On September 4, 2026, the Tennessee Firearms Association (TFA) and Tennessee Firearms Foundation (TFF) joined a coalition of national and state organizations and firearms manufacturers in filing an amicus brief in the Supreme Court of the United States in Viramontes, et al. v. Cook County, Illinois, et al., No. 25-238, and Grant, et al. v. Ronnell Higgins, et al., No. 25-566. The consolidated cases are before the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari from the Seventh and Second Circuits. The amici support the petitioners and ask the Court to reverse the judgments below.
For TFA and TFF, the cases present a fundamental Second Amendment question: can state and local governments prohibit ordinary citizens from acquiring and possessing AR-15s (like Memphis has tried to do with a charter amendment) and other semiautomatic rifles that are owned by tens of millions of Americans, simply by labeling them “assault weapons,” “unusually dangerous,” or “military”? The amicus brief answers no – and urges the Court to apply the text of the Second Amendment and the analytical rules already established in Heller, Bruen, Rahimi, and Wolford.
| “According to the courts below, no American has the right to own ‘America’s rifle.’ That is absurd on its face, and it violates the Second Amendment.”Amicus Br. at 8. |
What the Cases Are About
The two cases challenge so-called “assault weapons” bans imposed by Cook County, Illinois, and the State of Connecticut. Both laws broadly criminalize the acquisition, disposition, and even simple possession of magazine-fed semiautomatic rifles with features commonly associated with the AR-15. The challengers lost in the lower courts, but the two courts of appeals reached their results through materially different routes – all of which are wrong.
The Seventh Circuit: In Viramontes, the court relied on its earlier Bevis decision. Bevis treated the AR-15 as outside the Second Amendment at the threshold because it viewed the rifle as not materially different from the M16 and drew a “military or civilian” line that does not appear in the constitutional text. The panel also offered an alternative historical analysis that relied in part on a 1746 Boston ordinance regulating firearm discharge and later nineteenth-century regulations rather than a Founding-era tradition of banning possession of a class of commonly owned rifles.
The Second Circuit: In Grant, the court assumed without deciding that the proposed possession of the affected firearms was presumptively protected, but nevertheless upheld Connecticut’s law by reasoning that history permitted regulation of “unusually dangerous” weapons. The brief emphasizes that the historical laws invoked by the Second Circuit concerned public carry and affray-type conduct, not broad prohibitions on acquisition or possession in the home.
Those competing approaches matter because each creates a path for lower courts to avoid the Supreme Court’s text-and-history framework: one by narrowing the word “Arms” before the historical inquiry even begins, and the other by converting historical restrictions on threatening public conduct into a supposed tradition supporting modern possession bans.
What TFA and TFF Are Asking the Supreme Court to Hold
The amicus brief advances three principal arguments, while also urging the Court to avoid unnecessary discussion of machineguns or other weapons that are not at issue in these cases.
1. AR-15s and similar semiautomatic rifles are “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment. The brief begins with the constitutional text. Heller defined “Arms” broadly and held that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, including modern arms not in existence at the Founding. Bruen likewise directs courts to ask first whether the plain text covers the individual’s conduct. The brief relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Wolford, which reiterated that the term “Arms” reaches weapons customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes and that restrictions on keeping or bearing such arms are presumptively unconstitutional unless the government satisfies its historical burden.
| “The text contains no ‘individual self-defense’ qualifier, nor does it draw any distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ weapons.”Amicus Br. at 11. |
2. Common use is a decisive reason to invalidate these bans – not a threshold limitation on what counts as an “Arm.” The brief carefully separates the plain-text inquiry from the Court’s “common use” precedents. It argues that common use is sufficient to defeat a ban, because Heller described bans on weapons in common use as invalid, but common use is not a prerequisite that governments may use to exclude a bearable arm from constitutional coverage. Here, the factual premise is especially strong: Supreme Court opinions and individual Justices have repeatedly recognized that AR-15s are owned by tens of millions of Americans, are legal in the overwhelming majority of States, and are among the country’s most popular rifles.
The brief connects that rule to popular sovereignty. Government derives its authority from the people; it should not be permitted to invert that relationship by telling the people that their widespread choice of a constitutionally protected arm is itself a reason to prohibit it. As the brief quotes Justice Thomas: “Our Constitution allows the American people – not the government – to decide which weapons are useful for self-defense.” (Amicus Br. at 18.)
3. “Dangerous and unusual” history does not support modern possession bans. The brief argues that lower courts have stretched Heller‘s discussion of “dangerous and unusual weapons” beyond the historical record. The relevant common-law tradition regulated going armed in public in a manner that terrorized others and breached the peace. It did not prohibit a peaceful citizen from acquiring or possessing a particular class of arms in the home merely because government considered the arms dangerous or uncommon.
| “The Framers never banned the ownership or possession of discrete classes of weapons by virtue of their perceived dangerousness or rarity.”Amicus Br. at 20. |
That distinction follows Bruen’s requirement that a historical analogue impose a comparable burden and operate in a relevantly similar way. A law against threatening public brandishing is not the historical equivalent of a categorical ban on acquisition, ownership, and possession.
4. Calling a rifle “military” does not remove it from the Second Amendment. The brief rejects the lower courts’ military-versus-civilian distinction as textually unsupported and historically backwards. The Second Amendment’s militia language confirms that the Founding generation expected ordinary citizens to possess arms capable of serving militia purposes. The brief therefore argues that even if AR-15s were as similar to military arms as some lower courts claim, that fact would support protection rather than exclusion.
| “If AR-15s are as similar to ‘military’ weapons as the Seventh Circuit claims (they are not), then that is reason enough to protect them, not ban them.”Amicus Br. at 26. |
A Tennessee Historical Point
The brief also cites Tennessee’s own Supreme Court as historical confirmation of the Founding-era understanding of “arms.” In Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840), the Tennessee Supreme Court described protected “arms” as those “usually employed in civilized warfare” and constituting “the ordinary military equipment.” The brief uses Aymette alongside Founding-era writings from Madison, Hamilton, and Tench Coxe to rebut the theory that a weapon becomes constitutionally suspect merely because it has military utility. (Amicus Br. at 24-25.)
The Brief Also Warns the Court About Dicta
The final section makes a strategic point that is important well beyond these two cases. The disputes before the Court concern semiautomatic rifles – not machineguns. The brief argues that the Court should decide the questions actually presented and resist unnecessary commentary about machineguns or other “military” weapons. The reason is practical: lower courts have repeatedly seized on dicta from earlier Second Amendment opinions and turned it into purported rules that are broader than the Supreme Court’s holdings.
| “This Court should resist the temptation to perpetuate this cycle.”Amicus Br. at 27. |
The brief warns that gratuitous distinctions involving weapons not before the Court could create new doctrinal problems in future cases. Its closing caution is direct: unnecessary discussion could risk “arming the lower courts with even more ammunition to rule against the Second Amendment in future cases.” (Amicus Br. at 28.)
Why This Filing Matters
The Supreme Court’s treatment of Viramontes and Grant could affect far more than the two challenged laws. Lower courts continue to disagree over the proper treatment of semiautomatic-rifle bans after Heller and Bruen, including whether courts may redefine “Arms,” rely on broad “dangerousness” concepts, or import a civilian-versus-military distinction into the Second Amendment. A clear Supreme Court ruling can either close those escape routes or leave them available for continued use.
TFA and TFF joined this amicus brief because constitutional rights are protected not only in legislatures, but also in the courts where the meaning and reach of those rights are tested. When a case reaches the Supreme Court with the potential to shape Second Amendment doctrine nationwide, there is value in putting a direct, text-based and historically grounded argument before the Justices.
Another reason for TFA to join this action is the proven history of the Tennessee Legislature, particularly since 2011 during which it has been under the complete control of Republicans, to ignore the scope of the Second Amendment and the rights it protects. Increasingly, it is clear that the Tennessee Legislature as well as past and potentially future Republican governors will not honor the oath to protect the rights of Tennesseans as required by the constitutions. The increased reliance on litigation to restore constitutionally protected rights has become a cornerstone of grassroots advocacy at the local, state and federal levels.
Help TFA and TFF Continue This Work
Participating effectively in major constitutional litigation requires sustained legal research, careful briefing, coordination with counsel and allied organizations, and the ability to act when important cases reach critical filing stages. This September 4 amicus filing is one example of the work that donor support makes possible.
If you want the Tennessee Firearms Association to continue supporting serious Second Amendment litigation, legal research, and constitutional education, and you are a member of TFA, please consider making a financial contribution to TFA beyond your membership dues. Supplemental member contributions give TFA the resources to participate when important cases arise rather than having to stand on the sidelines.
If you want the Tennessee Firearms Foundation to continue supporting serious Second Amendment litigation, legal research, and constitutional education, please consider making a financial contribution to TFF. Contributions give TFF the resources to participate when important cases arise rather than having to stand on the sidelines.
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